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Rail plus Property mode, as a land value capture strategy, provides an opportunity, where public sector, transportation company and private developer can cooperate in financing, constructing and operating, developing the land around transit line. It could capture the land value through renting or selling the land that under and above transportation infrastructure, and subsidize the transit construction and operation cost. The Rail plus Property mode of Hong Kong makes railway system of Hong Kong a most profitable and efficient one in the world, which triggers the broad interest of other regions in the world to apply this mode, including big cities in mainland China like Shenzhen, and other international cities like New York. Based on the past research, the thesis will review and evaluate the Rail plus Property projects based on the case studies of Hong Kong, Shenzhen and New York City. The mode that succeed in Hong Kong will not necessary succeed in another due to the different social and economic environment.





Chapter 2 Background and Rationale of the Study
In the United States, “Funding for streets, highways, and public transit is provided through the joint efforts of federal, state and local governments, with taxation and user fees as primary revenue sources, supplemented by loans, bonds and public-private-partnerships” (Board, 2006). While in recent decades, the amount of funds allocated to construct, operate and maintain transportation systems has not grown in proportion to increasing needs. A 2007 report by the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission, Transportation for Tomorrow, suggests that an annual expenditure would be at least $225 billion for the next 50 years to upgrade the existing transportation system to a good state; while present spending is only about 40 percent of this amount (Zhirong Jerry Zhao, Kirti Vardhan Das, and Kerstin Larson, 2012), leading to concerns about the adequacy and effectiveness of the transportation system as it currently already exists(e.g. New York City subway and MTA deficits). Joint development of public transit and private real estate projects has been an accepted and popular practice since 1990s in U.S. to help fund the public transit. There are several modes including land banking, density bonus program, and so on. 

There is also a huge demand in Metro Rapid Transit in China while the government fund is limited. The massive speed and scale with which economic changes in Mainland China is exceeding those anywhere else around the world. Rising income of citizens, the consumerism concept of Chinese people and the weak restrictions imposed on car ownership by the Chinese government have led to highly problematic levels of traffic congestion and air quality in most key metropolises (Ng and Schipper, 2006; Smyth et al., 2008). The huge demand for urban transport demand is driven constantly by the rapid urbanization. National, provincial and local governments around the country have concluded that massive investments are urgently needed. The larger cities are in need of Metro Rapid Transit (MRT) to provide viable alternatives to car use, which need massive investments among national, provincial and local level. However, public funds are limited. 
The major financing mode in China currently is not sustainable and efficient enough. Urban land in China is owned by state, and after the marketization of land, the development right can be leased to private developers. Lumpy land lease payment and debt financing are the major sources that many Chinese cities are using for transit funding. While the lumpy land lease payments are so high, and there are also transit maintenance fee and expansion fee, also the government guaranteed loans have aggravated municipal financial liabilities. Local governments are responsible for the provision of a wide range of public goods and services, including not only the public transit but also medical, education facilities, the tax assignment system in China has resulted in a big fiscal imbalance between revenue and expenditure for local governments. As a result of fiscal stress and inter-jurisdictional competition, local governments have turned toward extra-budgetary revenues for government financing, and have relied on the sales of land rights for revenue to finance basic public services demanded by their residents and comply with mandates from the central government. Thus, it led to boarder adverse impacts such as urban sprawl, and put more pressure to urban transportation system.

Rail plus Property, as a way of value capture, is not a new concept.  It was successfully applied in the United States well over a century ago to finance urban streetcar networks (Bernick and Cervero, 1997).   By 1912, private landholders built inter urban rail lines, opening up land for property development that yielded tremendous profits, easily covering investment and operating costs.  In an automobile era like today, many global cities has resurrected the practice of public transport value capture, while the modes vary according to the different economic and social backgrounds among different regions. 


Figure 1 Synergy of Integrated Railway and Property Development Model 
(Source: Tang, B. (2004). Study of the Integrated Rail-Property Development Model in Hong Kong. Retrieved from
http://www.reconnectingamerica.org/assets/Uploads/mtrstudyrpmodel2004.pdf )
Firstly, rail plus property mode can help to increase the revenue of transportation project. There are research shows that transit access premiums in Chinese cities could reach between 2-10 billion RMB per line (about 20%-90% of the capital investments), however, these land premiums accrued from the improved accessibility of transit services have been largely captured by real estate developers (Lulu Xue, Wanli Fang, 2015). Rail plus property mode can realize the value capture through renting or selling the land or land development right to cover the expense. 

Secondly, rail plus property mode can promote the integrated development of transit line and land around. Rail plus property mode can help optimize the coordination of transportation planning and land use planning, thus promote the synergy between property and railway. The synergy between property and railway could increase the accessibility to transit and land value, improve ridership and promote development, thus provide financial benefit to government, and a sustainable urban living and growth generation (Figure 1).       

There are no other cities like Hong Kong which implements Rail plus Property mode so successfully and widely. Implemented by the Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC), the owner-operator of the city’s largest rail service, the Rail plus Property model is one of the best examples applying the “value capture” principle to finance railway investments. Given the high accessibility to fast, efficient and reliable public transport services in a dense and congested city like Hong Kong, the price of land near railway stations is generally higher than elsewhere.  The owner-operator of the transit system can recoup the cost of investing in rail transit and even turn a profit from property development. 

Rail plus Property seems a best example of value capture from the perspective of Hong Kong, and cities around the world are also trying to implement this mode. The way of implementing varies in different regions due to different social and economic background. For example, with the increasing housing and travel demands fueled by the rapid urbanization and urban sprawl, Mainland China has also been conducting several pilot projects for recent decades, most of the projects are trying to implement “Rail plus Property” mode that is famous and successful in Hong Kong. Under the existing policy and legal constrains, there are several innovative practices from the perspectives of land development, policies, economic investment, and financing mode. And for New York City, there is also concern on whether the Rail plus Property can be implemented from the perspective of operational cost, amount of government-owned land and the construction costs.

Considering the huge demand for public transit and limited fund, Rail plus Property, as a land value capture strategy that has been successfully implemented in Hong Kong, is a significant topic that deserves further research. The experience of Hong Kong is a valuable lesson for other cities, and the research on its scalability is important for the development of Rail plus Property mode around the world.

Chapter 3 Literature Review
There is research on the externality of public transportation, the effects of public transportation and urban growth, land value capture, public-private partnership, joint development, and also there are abundant research on the land value capture and joint development projects around the world, including the Rail plus Property mode. However, there is little research on the emerging land value capture projects in Mainland China, which are mainly implementing or considering implementing variations on Hong Kong’s Rail plus Property mode now.  
1 Land Value Capture as a Way of Public Transportation Funding
Value capture aims to capture the value of benefits received by property owners or developers as a result of infrastructure improvements, and to use these revenues to fund such improvements (Phu, N.T. 2007). Value capture is a way to generate revenue by recouping a portion of the gains in the value of land that result from improvements of public transportation. Value capture approach has two prerequisites. First, there should be sufficient value generated from public transport to be captured. Second, there should be favorable policy that enables local government to capture the value (Salon & Shewmake, 2011).

And there are eight common value capture strategies, according to a 2009 research report by the University of Minnesota, they are land value taxes (LVT), tax increment finance (TIF), special assessment districts (SAD), transportation utility fees (TUF), development impact fees, negotiated exactions, joint development, and air rights (Lacono, M., D. Levinson, Z. Zhao, and A. Lari. 2009). Different regions chose different value capture strategies according to their economical and social background, and there is not a “best” value capture strategy, only existing the one that fit the background of the region most. 
2 Concept of Joint Development 
As mentioned above, joint development is one of the strategies of value capture. There are several forms of joint development in transportation projects. The national Council for Urban Economic Development defines joint development as a public-private partnership designed to decrease the costs of constructing or operating public transportation improvements through creative public-private financing arrangements (National Council for Urban Economic Development 1989). The Sedway Kotin Mouchly Group defines joint development as real-estate transactions involving the development potential created by using publicly owned land or air rights (Sedway Kotin Mouchly Group, 1996). And Landis defines joint development as a formal agreement or arrangement between a public transit agency and a private individual or organization that involves either private sector paying to the public sector or sharing the cost with the public sector, in mutual recognition of the enhanced real-estate development potential created by public transit facility (Landis, J., R. Cervero, and P. Hall, 1991). 

The joint development of urban transit and private real estate projects has been an accepted and popular practice since 1990s in U.S. due to three key factors: “1) rising transit operating deficits; 2) a growth in new rail transit systems and rebuilding of old systems, and 3) the rebirth of the downtown in major cities, accompanied by increased commercial activities and real estate values” (Robert Cervero, Peter Hall, John Landis, 1991). Theoretically, joint development may be applicable to all types of transportation improvement that lead to higher property values or enhanced development potential (Zhirong Jerry Zhao, Kirti Vardhan Das, Kerstin Larson, 2012).
3 Mechanisms and Introduction of Joint Development Cases
There is a sizable body of research reviewing and analyzing joint development of urban transit and private real estate projects. Joint development can include different models based on the transportation modes, organizational structures, type of property ownership, funding allocations, etc. In Zhirong Zhao’s article, the joint development modes are organized in two dimensions: (1) Whether the properties or sites for joint development are owned by the public or private sector, and (2) Whether the transactions are based on property itself or only the development rights (Lacono, M., D. Levinson, Z. Zhao, and A. Lari. 2009).







Table 1 Joint Development Cases Summary for Public Land Ownership Background

Joint Development 	Examples
Public ownership: 	Sell the property for funding	Land-banking, Washington
	Lease the property for funding	Commercial space lease, Philadelphia
	Sell the development rights for funding	Development rights sale (Hong Kong)
	Lease the property rights for funding	Rail plus Property model, Hong KongDevelopment rights lease, Washington
	Exchange the development rights for private contributions	Development rights award, PortlandDevelopment rights award, Taipei 
	Auction and bid with certain condition	Rail-property model, Shenzhen

Table 2 Joint Development Cases Summary for Private Land Ownership Background

Joint Development 	Examples
Private ownership: 	Exaction through joint development	Land readjustment, TokyoLand acquisition, TaipeiLand consolidation, Taipei
	Usage adjustments in exchange for private contributions	Comprehensive plan change, TaipeiCommercial-industrial mixed use, Taipei
	Density bonus on development rights in exchange for private contributions	Density bonus program, New York City


(Source: Zhao, Z. (2012). Joint development as a value capture strategy for public transit finance. The Journal of Transportation and Land Use, 5, 5-17.)


4 Overview of Rail plus Property Projects
As a method of public-private partnership, Rail plus Property means using property development revenue to capture land value. Public sector, transportation company and private developer may cooperate in financing, constructing and operating, developing the land around transit line. Transportation company or the combination of transportation and private developer could capture the land value through renting or selling the land that under and above transportation infrastructure, and subsidize the transit construction and operation cost. 

And for a transportation project, there are different phases including financing, constructing, and operating. In the phase of construction, there are BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) mode and BT (Build-Transfer) mode. For BOT mode, the government will authorize the right to design, finance, construct and operate to the developer, developer will capture the value through ridership fee and property development, and transfer this right back to government after a certain number of years. While for BT mode, there is no operation process, the development right will transferred to government after construction, it can relieve the financial burden of government since the private developer will be responsible for fund rasing, with the solvency of government as the guarantee.

There are rail plus property projects in many regions and cities, including Hong Kong, Tokyo, Washington D.C., Toronto, Singapore, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Shanghai, etc. 
Except Tokyo, nearly all railway operators in these cities are public bodies, which are functionally, operationally and financially linked with the public authorities. Tokyo stands as an exception with its privately run railway companies.
Almost all of these railway operators operate other modes of public transport in addition to metro railways. This has often made them the principal providers of mass transit services in the cities. Mass transit railway is unlikely to be self-financing on its own. Almost all of them have to rely on government subsidies. Japanese railway companies rely on profits from real estate to subsidize its railway operations, in addition to the government subsidies.
Strong economic growth and buoyant real estate markets are essential to support the construction of mass transit railway in the cities.
Projects in U.S. are mostly found in a few cities: New York, Washington, D.C., Boston, Philadelphia, and Atlanta. While the development of joint development in U.S. is slow. (Robert Cervero, Peter Hall, John Landis, 1991). The reasons are complicated. There are public distrust, laws or opposition from elected offices that leads to the limited transit agency participation, which in turn, causes the limited experience in “engaging in any kind of entrepreneurship”, like cooperate with Real Estate companies. Since the precondition of a transit-linked joint development is a comparatively mature real estate market and a well developed public urban transit network, while most US cities lack these features where driving is main commute approach. 

In Tokyo, a public or private developer organizes property owners into a cooperative, which authorizes the developer to develop the property, returning smaller but fully serviced parcels, to landowners when the development, including transportation and infrastructure projects, is complete. (Zhirong Jerry Zhao, Kirti Vardhan Das, and Kerstin Larson, 2012). The developer gains a portion of the new property parcels as compensation for their development services. For example, Tokyo Corporation, a private railway operator and real estate developer, completed the Tama Denen Toshi development, a planned community serviced by a rail line, using the land readjustment model. Tokyo Corporation and its affiliated companies then promoted the area’s development by selling land, constructing housing, and attracting shopping centers and schools. The project is viewed as one of the most successful land development initiatives undertaken by a private Japanese company, requiring no direct government subsidy (Farrell et al. 1994; Kuranami et al. 2000). 
In Hong Kong and Mainland China, land is owned by state. So the joint development appears in different modes from that in U.S. or Tokyo. The “Rail + Property” development of Hong Kong is a famous and successful integration of rail transit investment and urban development, while it will not be achieved without the high densities of the city, world-class railway services and favorable legal and institutional environment. And there are many emerging joint development of railway and real estate in Mainland, China. The rail-property in Shenzhen line 1, 2,3,5 and the line 4 under MTR Corporation (Shenzhen) Limited are all pilot projects. All of those projects apply Hong Kong’s railway and property mode within the land policy of Mainland China with some changes like “auction and bid within certain condition” to smooth the project. 

Most of Singapore’s new towns and high-quality rail transit have been co-dependent, under the control of municipal divisions and government-linked companies. (Robert Cervero and Jin Murakami, 2008).






The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether the Rail plus Property mode in Hong Kong can be transferred to other cities, and analyze the reason for different modes’ success, also the thesis is trying to conclude the institutional and market conditions that are necessary for successful Rail plus Property mode.

The research will be case-based with secondary data analysis from archival research, and semi-structured interviews with scholars, subway and real estate managers, and so on.

The study will analyze three cases, including (1) The Rail plus Property model for development in Hong Kong as a background case study, (2) The transit joint development of real estate project in Shenzhen, China as a main case study, and (3) Rail plus Property in New York as a comparison case study.

I chose Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and New York for case studies to see whether the Rail plus Property mode in Hong Kong can be transferred successfully to other cities.

Hong Kong is chosen as a baseline case study since it is the most profitable railway system in the world, and the Rail plus Property mode in Hong Kong is famous, successful and mature. Many Mainland Chinese cities and other international cities have shown a keen interest in adopting this model for building their urban mass transit systems.

Shenzhen is a coastal first-tier Chinese city where Rail plus Property mode was first successfully implemented at full scale since 2004, though it is only the fifth city to develop a subway system after Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangzhou. Compared to these other cities in China, Shenzhen has a more mature, diverse and systematic financing mechanism, and a deeper and further institutional revolution through innovative practice. 





Chapter 5 Findings and Analysis
1 Baseline Case Study: Rail plus Property Mode in Hong Kong
1.1 Introduction of MTR

The Mass Transit Railway (MTR) is the rapid transit railway system in Hong Kong. MTR Company (MTRC) was established in the mid-1970s. The MTRC has carried out its missions of constructing and operating a mass transit railway on prudent commercial principles. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government was the sole owner of the MTRC until October 2000, when about 24% of its shares have been privatized and traded in the stock exchange. After that, MTRC became a public-private owned company, with 76% is governmental owned. 

The MTR system is operated by MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL). It is one of the most profitable systems in the world, with a high fare box recovery ratio of 186%. In 2014, it has a total revenue of 40.2 billion HK Dollars (5.18 billion US Dollars), with the underlying profit as 11.6 billion HK$ (1.50 US Dollars). The value of its net assets is 163.5 HK Dollars (21.09 US Dollars), and the Net Debt-to-Equity Ratio is only 7.6%. As a successful and most profitable railway operation system in the world, the MTR has served as a model for other newly built systems in the world, particularly in mainland China.
1.2 Railway Operations and Services
Under the government's rail-led transport policy, the MTR system has significantly transformed the travel patterns since it opened in 1979. With over five million trips made in an average weekday, it consistently achieves a 99.9% on-time rate on its train journeys. In 2014, the Domestic Service  Fare Revenue Per  Passenger is HK$ 7.31 (USD 0.94). The MTR has a 48.1% market share of the franchised public transport market and carried over 1.45 billion of passengers, making it the most popular transport option in Hong Kong.





Figure 2 MTR System Map

Source: Retrieved from http://www.mtr.com.hk/en/corporate/main/index.html
1.3 MTR System and Properties
1.3.1 Properties Investment and Management
Apart from railway operations, the MTRC has also engaged in property development, including investment and management. In Hong Kong, MTRC develop for sale mainly residential properties in conjunction with property developers, and also hold investment properties, principally shopping malls and offices, and manage these and other properties. 

The Corporation has completed developments at 39 MTR stations, the investment portfolio primarily includes shopping malls and 18 office floors of the Two International Finance Centre office tower, respectively 2,287,330 Square Feet of retail properties, and 441,384 Square Feet of offices. In 2014, the profit from property investment accounts for 10% of the total revenue, and the station commercial revenue accounts for 18% of the total revenue. The company also manages 93,727 residential flats, and 8213057.4 Square Feet of commercial and official space in Hong Kong until 2015, which make the company become one of the largest property managers in Hong Kong. 

Figure 3 MTR Properties Map

Source: Retrieved from http://www.mtr.com.hk/en/corporate/main/index.html (​http:​/​​/​www.mtr.com.hk​/​en​/​corporate​/​main​/​index.html​)
Real property has been contributing to MTRC mainly in two ways. First, it provides an important source of income to finance the transportation projects. Integrated rail-property development projects lead to higher property values. The analysis of some sample housing estates indicates that the additional premium ranges between HK$98 and HK$280 per sq. ft. gross floor area.

Second, the property development creates population catchment areas that promote the patronage of the railway. High concentrations and densities of both population and employment are associated with high MTR station ridership. It is estimated that every single unit of public housing unit and of private housing unit within 500 m of an MTR station account for about 1.97 and 1.62 passengers, respectively, using the station as an origin on a typical day.
1.3.2 Process of Property Development





(Source: Tang, B. (2004). Study of the Integrated Rail-Property Development Model in Hong Kong. Retrieved from
http://www.reconnectingamerica.org/assets/Uploads/mtrstudyrpmodel2004.pdf )

The first step for MTRC is to reach agreement with government and secure land grant. In Hong Kong, lands are public owned. MTRC would first plan the alignment of the railway line with the government and assess the construction costs. Then the company will discuss with the government on property development opportunities that enhance the rate of return on the overall investment. MTRC will apply for necessary statutory approvals for the developments and negotiate the terms of the land grants with the government. The project agreement that MTRC and the government would reach typically contains the grant land from government for property development at identified sites along the railway. 

The Second step for MTRC is to cooperate with private developer for property development. Then the private developers are solicited by the MTRC as partners to implement the projects. The development packages are offered to private developers through public tenders. Tender packages normally contain a design scheme prepared by MTRC. Private developers are responsible for the detailed design in compliance to the development agreement with the MTRC. The MTRC will carry out the civil works and control technical standards for interfacing between its railway premises and the property development. The private developer is responsible for all development costs, including the “land premiums, construction costs, finance costs, professional fees, marketing costs, and expenses related to the selling and leasing of the completed properties”.

The third step is to share profit. The MTRC derives economic benefit from property developments through profit sharing with the developers in agreed proportions of cash profits from the sale or lease of the properties. A 'no cash, no risk' approach has been adopted in its joint venture partnership with the developers (Cheng, 1988). Under the agreement, the private developers are not allowed to use the property interests as collateral to obtain finance. Equally, the MTRC will not be liable to any losses arising from the development. The developers have to take up all the losses.
1.4 MTRC’s Mainland China and International Projects
Over the past decades, MTRC has taken its expertise in railway development and operations in Mainland China, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Australia. MTRC has been involved and invested in projects in other countries. According to different background of cities, the projects has been structured as Public-Private Partnerships, including Build-Operate-Transfer, and Operations and Maintenance concessions.

Table 3 MTRC International Projects






Crossrail (Tfl Rail, UK)	May 2015	32.5	12	NA
Beijing Metro Line 4/Daxing Line	Sep 2009/Dec 2009	28/22	24/11	461
Bejing Metro Line 14(Phase 1/ Phase 2)	May 2013/Dec 2014	12.4/14.8	7/12	18
Shenzhen Metro Longhua Line	Phase 1: Jul 2010Phase 2: Jun 2011	20.5	15	168.7
Hangzhou Metro Line 1	Nov 2012	48	31	144.4

*Shenzhen Metro Longhua Line Phase 1 assets are owed by the Shenzhen Municipal Government
*Stations managed by MTR subsidiaries/affiliates. In the case of MTR Express, the tracks and the stations are wholly owned and operated and maintained by the government.

Source: MTR Annual Report, 2014

For the business in Mainland China, the Corporation operates railway services in Beijing, Shenzhen and Hangzhou. Beijing rail lines are operated by Beijing MTR Corporation Limited (Beijing MTR), a joint venture company comprising MTR Corporation, Beijing Infrastructure Investment Co. Ltd. and Beijing Capital Group. The lines include: Beijing Metro Line 4, a RMB 15.3 billion Public-Private Partnership project, Beijing Metro Daxing Line, an extension of Line 4, and Beijing Metro Line 14, a RMB 50 billion PPP, which is opening in phases with full line operation after 2017.

In July 2010, MTR Corporation (Shenzhen) Limited, which is completely owned by Hong Kong MTRC Hong Kong took over operations of Phase 1 of Shenzhen Metro Longhua Line (Line 4). The following Phase 2 of the line is a 16-km, 10-station extension constructed by MTR (Shenzhen) and is funded on a Build-Operate- Transfer model.

Hangzhou Metro Line 1, which started service in November 2012, is a RMB 22 billion joint venture PPP project between MTR and Hangzhou Metro Group Co. Ltd.

The Hong Kong MTRC has also engaged in property development. MTR’s first property development in Mainland China, is called “Tiara” above the depot of the Shenzhen Metro Longhua Line. The site has a developable gross floor area of over 200,000 square meters. MTR won the bid for the site in August 2011, and successfully launched the pre-sale of residential units in 2015.

In August 2013, MTR won the bid for a site at Beiyunhe Station along Tianjin Metro Line 6 through a joint venture with Tianjin Metro (Group) Company Ltd. A mixed use development of over 270,000 square meters will be built at the Tianjin site.

1.5 Summary and Findings
As the most profitable Rail plus Property mode of the world, the MTRC does not rely on government’s subsidies to support its daily operations on a regular basis. Property related incomes work out as an important contribution to the MTRC operations.

For the Rail plus Property mode of Hong Kong, the government creates a “favorable incentive and constraint environment”, sets major policy and strategy that take into account the public interest in connection with the joint development of the mass transit railway and station property.

The property developers are responsible for implementing the projects comply with site-specific requirements and the agreement of the joint development. The MTRC engages actively in property development and investment activities while it is not privately owned. MTRC acts as the intermediary between the government and the developers. It coordinates the implementation of the projects, converts strategic objectives and policies into site-specific requirements, and balances possible conflicts between public and private interests.

For the policy environment, government grant the exclusive property development rights of the station sites to the MTRC and provide a favorable policy environment. And MTRC has the commitment to develop mass transit railway. Also the arrangement of land premium payment by property developers eliminate the land holding costs of the MTRC. These relieve a major financial burden on the MTRC in the process of land banking and acquisition.

For the project, MTRC operates on prudent commercial principle with a market-oriented business strategy, which ensures that it will only pursue financially viable projects, and avoid purely public welfare projects. MTRC develops high-quality real estate projects that contain “high development density, appropriate land use diversity and attractive layout design” and “integrate well with the railway facilities at the appropriate locations and at the right timing”.

For the development process: MTRC manages and controls procedures and effective development processes that seek to maximize the synergy between railway and property from the stages of project inception to completion.

For the organization: The mode is implemented by the MTRC as a single entity that helps to reduce the high transaction costs, since the subway station and the property above are closely linked in site footage, civil works. It will be time and money consuming to disentangle and divide all these activities into separate contracts if they are not planned or managed by a single entity like the MTRC. Also MTRC as a single entity which has rich specialized experience can react efficiently and flexibly to adjust uncertain market changes, and has more incentive to enhance and capture the value of its assets.
2 Comparative Case Study: Rail plus Property mode in New York City
2.1 Background
New York has its subway network since 1904. It is the largest in North America. A public corporation, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), operates most of the transit services in New York City. In 2014, the subway delivered over 1.75 billion rides, averaging approximately 5.6 million daily rides on weekdays and a combined 5.9 million rides each weekend (3.2 million on Saturdays; 2.7 million on Sundays). (MTA, 2015). 
2.2 Existing Value Capture Schemes
New York has used value capture once before, but the Tax Increment Financing (TIF) strategy is not like the Rail plus Property one.
The No. 7 train extension is a best example for the land value capture. The No. 7 Subway Extension in New York is part of the Hudson Yards Redevelopment Project. The train currently terminates in Times Square. With the extension, there will be a new station two miles further at 34th Street and 11th Avenue. The construction began in late 2007. After being postponed for several times, the new station is now come into service (MTA, 2015).

With the land already are privately owned, the Bloomberg administration worked out a deal whereby it sold bonds to pay for the estimated $2 billion project, with property tax revenues from all future office buildings in the area, which is totally 25 million square feet, directly paying off the bonds. On the cost side, the subway line saw around $300 million in cost overruns. For a developed city like New York, 25 million square feet of new office space around a single stop can’t be replicated anywhere else in the city.

2.3 The Differences between New York and Hong Kong
In terms of the scalability of Rail plus Property in New York, the political, social and urban configuration of New York makes it difficult to implement the Rail plus Property mode like Hong Kong and Shenzhen do. 

2.3.1 High Operational Costs

The first distinction between Hong Kong and New York is one of operational budgets. In Hong Kong, the fares that MTR charges riders cover the operational costs and more with a total fare box recovery ratio of 186%, fares more than totally covered the cost of electricity, maintenance, salaries for workers and other ongoing costs. In New York, by contrast, fares only covered 57 percent of operating expenses in 2012. Since value capture has traditionally gone toward funding system expansions, the high operational costs will not likely to be covered through real estate development.

2.3.2 Lack of Government-owned Land
Another major difference between New York and Hong Kong, Shenzhen is that the former does not own enough land that has appreciation potential to give to the MTA. In Hong Kong, MTR is granted land around its future stations, paying a very low price and then reaping profits from either developing the land or selling it off to developers with already-entitled development rights. In Shenzhen, through the a “Conditional Bid Invitation, Auction and Listing”, the government guarantees that Shenzhen Metro would get the land development right at a low price. 

In New York and most of the rest of the developed world, land around possible future stations has been privately owned for centuries. For area along Second Avenue in Manhattan, or Utica and Nostrand Avenues in Brooklyn, where the city might build future lines, the land are privately owned. Where the government does own land, for example, above New York’s rail yards, it’s difficult to develop.

2.3.3 High Construction Costs
Hong Kong has very high construction costs by the standards of other dense, wealthy cities, with one small subway tunnel costing the equivalent of almost $600 million per kilometer, and another longer one clocking in at nearly $700 million per kilometer. These relatively high costs may partly explain why Hong Kong needs to develop land to pay for new rail lines in the first place. But New York’s costs is even higher. The Second Avenue Subway is coming in at $2.7 billion per mile. The 7 train extension to the far West Side costs $2.1 billion per mile. But why is construction cost so expensive? The answer always seems to be related to various issues: “labor costs, work rules, managerial incompetence, the spaghetti of infrastructure tangled beneath Manhattan’s streets, and a political firmament without incentive to tackle hard issues”.

2.3.4 not so much new development project
2.4 Summary and Findings
Though Rail plus Property works quite successfully in Hong Kong, and implemented smoothly in Shenzhen, for many other international and developed cities like New York, the character of city and its railway system are not providing a favorable condition of Rail plus Property mode. 

As for New York City, it is using the different land value capture strategy, since the high operational costs, lack of public-owned lands, and the high constructions fees are all the existing conditions for New York that hampering the Rail plus Property mode from being implementing.


3 Core Case Study: Rail plus Property Mode in Shenzhen
The reason that I chose Shenzhen as a core case study on whether the Rail plus Property is scalable is because Tiara in Shenzhen is the first property that Hong Kong MTR develop with the railway in Mainland China, outside Hong Kong. For Shenzhen, the implemented rail plus property mode is where the land is owned by state and the transaction is based on development right. The social and economic conditions of Shenzhen provide both opportunities and constrains for the Rail plus Property development, and Shenzhen is reacting with innovative practice.                                                                                                                      
3.1 Opportunities and Challenges 
3.1.1 Opportunities
With the rapid urbanization and limited land in Chinese big cities, the high density is usually the urban pattern and it provides high property appreciation potential. Also subway systems are often considered the backbone of any metropolitan public transport system in Chinese leading cities, which require rapid extension and development. Like many other Asian countries, China is placing high priority on construction and extension of subway networks.
3.1.2 Challenges
According to the land policy and law system in China, if the land above or around the subway line is defined as commercial use, the sell of development right should go through the Bid Invitation, Auction and Listing process, while for land underground that is for subway line, it is defined as public purpose and will go through the land allocation process. 

For land above or around the subway that are defined as commercial use, only planning the commercial land into the transportation plan that can guarantee the integrated development of subway line and the property above, but that is conflict with the land policy since the sell of development right should go through the auction biding listing process which is open to market, rather than the allocation process that is same as the land underground for subway line. For the Bid Invitation, Auction and Listing process, the metro company should compete with many other real estate companies or private developer for the land development right. When real estate companies can bid against metro company, it is possible that they bid for land at a higher price and get the development, there will be less motivation for real estate companies to reach a public-private partnership with the metro company or the related governmental agencies, thus the Rail plus Property mode cannot be implemented. Besides, the high lease payment and transaction fee increases the financial pressure and decrease the incentive of for metro companies.

3.2 Innovative Practice in Policy and Finance Mechanism
Table 4 Three phases of development of Shenzhen Subway

Phase	Development Period	Subway Lines 	Length (km)	Amount of Investment 	Building Area (Million KM2)
I	1998-2004	Line 1 and Line 4	22	10.6	
II	2006-2011	Line 2,3,5Extensions of Line 1 and Line 4	155	74.8	3.39
III	2011-2016	Line 6,7,8,9,10 	254	81.2	4.77













Source: Retrieved from http://www.szmc.net/page/en/index.html
3.2.1 Phase I 
Line 1 and Line 4 was constructed in phase I is from 1998 to 2004 with the total length of 22 km and capital investment of 10.6 billion Yuan. Government dominated this period and there is no public-private partnership. The project had been funded through traditional channels with 70% of the project expenditure coming from the Shenzhen government and 30% from bank loans obtained by the same government. The loan syndicate consists of China Development Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and Bank of China provided 35 billion of mortgages within 15 years, the interest is 10% below the benchmark interest rates over the same period.

3.2.2 Phase II
Given rapid increases in car traffic in the city (with 800 extra cars on the road each day leading to a doubling of car ownership every 2–3 years) and the goal of traffic congestion mitigation along the North–South axis and with Hong Kong, the long-term plans of the Shenzhen government are far more ambitious. From phase II (2006-2011), Shenzhen started to explore public-private partnership and implement rail plus property mode. During this period, line 2, 3, 5 and extension of line 1 and line 4 were constructed, line 4 extension was constructed by MTR Corporation (Shenzhen) Limited, and line 1 extension, line 3 and line 5 were responsible by Shenzhen Metro. The total length is 155 km and the capital investment increased to 74.8 billion Yuan. The building area is 3.39 million km2. In this period, Shenzhen implemented rail plus property mode through “Conditional Bid Invitation, Auction and Listing”. Capital provided by government decreased to 50%, and the other 50% came from loans and property development revenue. 

3.2.2.1 Shenzhen Metro
Shenzhen government was aware that it is challenging for a traditional state owned metro company, like Shenzhen Metro, to implement rail plus property mode without appropriate planning and enough financing and policy support. In order to motivate Shenzhen Metro under the policy and institutional constrains, Shenzhen government paid multiple efforts, such as decreasing cost, and build an appropriate revenue distribution mode.

Firstly, Shenzhen government decrease the proportion of government provided funding to from 70% to 50%, thus, the state owned company will less rely on public funding and seek for other alternatives. 

Secondly, the Shenzhen government implemented a “Conditional Bid Invitation, Auction and Listing”, which is complying the current regulation that the land development right for commercial use should go through the Bid Invitation, Auction and Listing process, while at the same time, through setting conditions on company characteristic, certificate, to filter other competitors like private real estate company, and guarantee that Shenzhen Metro would get the land development right at a low price. 

Finally, after the Shenzhen Metro Corporation pay the premium to the government for land development right, the government will return part of the premium in the form of investment. This innovative process is actually facilitate the Shenzhen Metro to capture land value, and also indirectly subsidy the Shenzhen Metro with land asset, rather than directly provide government funding. Consequently, the financial burden of Shenzhen Metro is further relieved, the flexibility of capital is improved, and Shenzhen Metro is much more motivated to get involved into the Rail plus Property projects. 

3.2.2.2. MTRC Shenzhen
The extension of line 4 running from Shaoniangong (the point connecting the first phase of the 4th line) to Qinghu in Northern Shenzhen. It is 16 km in length and the estimated project cost is 5.9 billion Yuan. 

MTR Corporation (Shenzhen) Limited was established in 2004 and is affiliated to MTRC Hong Kong.Early in 2005, in order to take advantage of the rich experience and professional management and operation on rail plus property mode of MTR, Shenzhen Metro and MTRC Shenzhen had reached Shenzhen metro line 4 franchise agreements, which regulate that the land development right along subway line can be assigned directly to MTRC Shenzhen without Conditional Bid Invitation, Auction and Listing process, and MTRC Shenzhen will complete the land lease payment through seven years at a certain discount. While the National Development and Reform did not approve the plan Commission due to its contrary to Land Law. 

In 2009, Mainland China and Hong Kong Special Administration Region signed the supplementary agreement in Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, which allows Hong Kong service providers participate in the form of sole proprietorship in construction, operation and management project of Shenzhen metro line 4. Based on this agreement, the National Development and Reform Commission and other relevant departments approved the MTRC Shenzhen to participate in the construction operation in the process of Shenzhen metro line 4. Also on this basis, the Shenzhen municipal government and the MTRC Shenzhen signed the 30 years franchise contract that allows the MTRC Shenzhen construction operation and management in the form of wholly owned the subway line 4. A Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model was used in which private players subsidize both the construction and operations from profits obtained in real estate management, freeing the government from the duty to subsidize public transport. MTR(Shenzhen)







Compared to the second phase, the financing channel of the construction of the Shenzhen metro, phase three is more systematic. While in the second phase of Shenzhen metro construction there was creative adoption to the political and institutional environment, there are still existing some problems including: 

Uncertainty in “Conditional Bid Invitation, Auction and Listing” since it does not always guarantee the metro company to get the land at a lower cost especially for some land with high appreciation potential, since those land may also attract other competitive private real estate developer for the bidding process. 

There does still exist financial pressure. Although the final cost will be returned, in the early stage the subway company still needs to raise funds to pay for the land lease in the initial stages, which will add funding pressure on the metro company. 

Also, the capital is, rather than being spent on the construction, circulating within the financial system without flowing into the real economy entity, which increases the policy risks. All the solutions in Phase II cannot be long-term and large-scale operation.

In order to solve these problems, based on the innovative practices in phase II, the government make capital contribution with land use rights. This implementation is innovative in the field of public transit finance, while it has been widely used in other urban development projects since the State-owned Enterprise Reform since 1990s. In 1998, the “State-owned Enterprise Reform: the Allocation of Land Use Rights Management Interim Provisions" (国有企业改革:划拨土地使用权管理暂行规定) states: "Making capital contribution with land use right is a special method during state-owned enterprise reform, it refers that the state guarantee a certain period of land use right to the enterprise as a capital contribution. The land use rights would be held by the enterprises, and enterprises can manage the land in accordance with the laws and regulations on land use right transfer, lease or mortgage. "

During the period of phase III, “Shenzhen land management system reform plan " was officially announced in May 2012. This land reform is affecting the entire Chinese Current Land System, and is leading possible significant changes in Chinese land economy. When the current auction and the expensive land transfer fees has caused a lot of problems, it is necessary to not only ensure a sustainable way for local government to capture land value, but also provide flexibility and efficiency for the second land exploitation. 

Under the reform, the innovation to meet with the approved by the Ministry of Land and Resources, making Shenzhen became the first domestic pilot city to develop urban subway, airport and other large infrastructure projects using land development right as capital contribution from government. The agreement was signed by 
Shenzhen Urban Planning and Land Resources Committee, SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council), and Shenzhen Metro Company.

The capital value is based on the evaluation of the land price, bank or bond issuer will evaluate the land price based on real estate market conditions, and appreciation potentials, etc. Compared with the strategy of returning the premium back to Metro company, making capital contributions by land sue rights relief the financial burden of metro company at the initial stage and provide more future opportunities to obtain greater profits.

3.2.4 Summary of Three Phases

From phase I to phase III, the evolution process of the financing mechanism of Shenzhen metro strongly facilitate the Rail-Property Development, though Shenzhen gains valuable lesson from its predecessors like Hong Kong, what is more important is the unremitting exploration of Shenzhen municipal government in ten years. 

Firstly, in terms of the government investment proportion and investment structure, it transforms from the traditional way of direct capital investment of government to land use right as capital contribution. The local government and the project company abandoned the past rough financing way, and transformed in the direction of fine and diversified. However, due to the administrative regulations, Shenzhen government’s investment structure in subway construction has to be at least 50% of the total capital investment needed, which is quite limited and can only within the land fixed assets. 
 
Secondly, in terms of participants, the evolution is from a single investment subject of Shenzhen government to the mode of “government-led, the state-owned company took positive transformation, and incorporate private sector to provide advanced experience for reference”. The government initiates to decrease the proportion of direct-government-subsidy, thus the state owned metro company became actively to explore alternative ways to collect funding. Through the cooperation of MTRC Shenzhen, the market-oriented operation mode of MTRC Shenzhen also provides a benchmarking and good example for Shenzhen Metro, and other cities in Mainland China. 
3.3 Property Development
For MTRC Shenzhen, the first property development project “Tiara”was finished in December 16, 2013, including 1698 residential units and a shopping mall with 107,639 sf. 

Compared to MTRC Shenzhen, which is privately hold, Shenzhen Metro, as a state-owned metro company, the goals are not only maximizing profit, but also achieving nonmonetary objectives. The four affordable housing project on Qianhai, Tanglang, Henggang, Shekou stations were finished in the end of 2013, and Shenzhen Metro is exploring commercial housing development.

There is also diversity in the location, project size, land characteristic, development scale and intensity of Shenzhen rail plus property development projects. Shenzhen now has 14 property development projects, seven for the second phase and the other seven for the third phases. 

In terms of location and program, the characteristic includes the diversified development of lots (including the depot, subway stations and parking lot), and the diversification and development that match the local conditions (including commercial, residential and office mixed overall comprehensive development project on the property, public green space, sports sites, education and scientific research of mixed land). 

According to the developer of the location, the Shenzhen subway plus property development divided into two categories: the rapid development of urban edge (referred to as " Type One "), and the city has built urban subway plus property development projects (referred to as " Type Two”).

For Type One in the rapidly expanding urban fringe or new urban area, due to the relatively low cost of land acquisition, rail plus property development projects often use rail depot, parking area, or block with irregular shape and are less attractive in land market for property development. These sites are usually developed for industrial, residential, parks or nature undetermined land, there are also some mixed land use basis for a comprehensive development of lower cost and a high appreciation potential.





And also “stratified right” are used in the practice. There are local regulations that support stratified land use rights for metro company.
Figure 6 Stratified Right of Shenzhen Rail plus Property Mode Development
Source: Made by Author
For underground subway, the land are used for public infrastructure and allocated by government. For properties above that are having commercial use, the land development right is sold through the conditional Bid Invitation, Auction and Listing process.
3.4 Summary and Findings
In order to implement the Rail plus Property mode of Hong Kong successfully, based on the process of Hong Kong, Shenzhen adapted many innovative strategies both in policy part and in financial mechanism. Also, based on the urban configuration of Shenzhen, it adapts its own way for property development. 

Firstly, Shenzhen government decrease the proportion of government provided funding to 50%, thus, the state owned company will less rely on public funding and seek for other alternatives. 

Secondly, Shenzhen government implement a “Conditional Bid Invitation, Auction and Listing”, which is complying the current regulation of Mainland China that the land development right for commercial use should go through the Bid Invitation, Auction and Listing process, while at the same time, through setting conditions on company characteristic, certificate, to filter other competitors like private real estate company, and guarantee that Shenzhen Metro would get the land development right at a low price. 







Chapter 6 Conclusions and Recommendations
The Rail plus Property mode in Hong Kong seems scalable to cities like Shenzhen, where the city adopts many innovative practices to implement Rail plus Property mode under the institutional constrains. While New York has difficulties in implementing Rail plus Property mode widely, often using some more compromised way as Tax Increment Financing, and so on. 

There is not a best land value capture strategy, but only the one that suits the tax system, land ownership condition, economic and political background of the area. And there could also be combinations of different land value capture strategies, which can provide more efficient channels for funding public transit.
	
For countries in North America, South America and for the United Kingdom, taxing the increase in value is the most common approach. In a fixed distance surrounding the rail transit site, real estate owners and merchants are required to pay extra tax to subsidize the costs of the infrastructure investments. This model works best in areas with a well-developed real estate tax system.

Rail plus Property mode is generally applicable to the area with limited land with high accessibility of land, and also high land appreciation potential, such as Japan, South Korea Singapore and Hong Kong.

Land leasing and selling mode works through the transfer of land along the rail transit corridor. It is usually a profit mainly generated form the process of urbanization and urban expansion, when rural land transforms to urban land. Government in these cases, use the leasing and sales income to fund the creation of public transit. In these cases a large proportion of the benefit usually falls into the hand of private real estate developers. This is not a financially sustainable process, and actually is not a land value capture mode. It is common in developing countries where land is state owned.

On the other hand, the Rail plus Property mode is sustainable because it integrates both side of the value creation process; railway and property development. It is thus able to generate the following key social and economic benefits.
For railway, the urban rail transit will significantly improve the land value around the stations. By capturing these values through property development and other means, the railway operator can finance the construction of the urban railway on its own.
For properties along the railway, the development of public transit will increase the accessibility of the property, and is expected to be favored by the buyers and hence are likely to command higher values than other properties. Also the land around railway stations will improve the ridership of the railway and hence its operational viability.
For government, the government can receive financial gains in terms of the land premiums, and the government is not required to subsidize the operations of the railway if it is financially sustainable.
For the society, it promotes the compactness of urban development, the more efficient use of scarce urban space, less urban sprawl, reduced air pollution from cars, and improved pedestrian-friendly environment. 

The following conditions could facilitate the development of Rail plus Property mode.

Urban context should be high density, public transit relied transportation behavior and there should be enough government owned land with high appreciation and development potential in order to capture the land value.

The favorable government policy supports are needed in terms of the exclusive land grant to the developer, and the agreement for the commitment to develop the public transit and the real estate development that meet the requirements of the whole plan between the government, the transportation agency and the private developer is needed. 

Also, it is recommended and important that the management and control procedures and effective development processes to maximize the synergy between transportation planning and land use planning, which means railway and property development can be tailored to each other to the maximum extent, from the stages of project inception to completion. 

The development projects should be high-quality real estate projects that either contain high development density, or meet the demand of the certain development period or area of the city. Appropriate land use diversity and attractive layout design is needed, and it should also integrate well with the railway facilities at the appropriate locations and at the right timing.   
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Figure 3 Stratified Land Use Right
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